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Article 5

THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN ANCIENT REPUBLICAN ROME

I
In ancient Greece or, to be more exact, in ancient Athens
the general socio-political situation was distinctly inimical
to the development of a true legal profession.' The sovereign and democratic people of Athens, at least during
the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth
century B.C., displayed a pronounced and lasting aversion
to the professional lawyer. This aversion, it seems, was
in keeping with that general and unfortunate dislike and
mistrust of any kind of professional expertness which was
so characteristic of Athenian democracy. The people of

Athens appear to have believed that by his expertness a
professional man set himself apart from and, hence,
against the democratic community in that, by his superior
skill and knowledge, he became part of an undemocratic
elite or aristocracy. In sum, it was held by many Athenians that professional excellence was not only undemocratic but actually anti-democratic. This general and, it
seems, calculated hostility towards the lawyer is a blemish
on the otherwise splendid intellectual and cultural record
of ancient Athens.
This animosity towards the professional lawyer in the
long run had truly disastrous results for the Athenian
legal practitioner. Smarting under the constant blows of
popular disfavor, he continued to display all the grave
faults that are common to the early beginnings of every
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great calling. Being unable to grow and mature to respectability, he simply remained disreputable. More than that,
apparently in a spirit of undisciplined and short-sighted
defiance, not a few legal practitioners at Athens seem to
have gloried in their many and serious moral and technical shortcomings.
All this may explain the nearly complete absence among
Athenian legal practitioners of professional competence,
professional pride and professional standards. Under these
circumstances no respectable legal profession could
possibly have evolved. Hence it is not surprising that professional standards - technical as well as ethical - were
something distinctly alien to the Athenian "lawyer":
whenever social prejudice and adverse political pressure
prevent the orderly emergence of an organized and selfrespecting profession, no well calculated and disciplined
tendency towards perpetuating that profession through the
insistence on technical competence and dignified deportment can develop.!
Had ancient Athens permitted its lawyers to practice
their profession freely and honorably in an atmosphere of
benevolent cooperation; had it promoted rather than imr
peded the healthy growth of a true legal profession and
allowed its legal practitioners to achieve real excellence,
pride of accomplishment and prominence of position within the Athenian community, Athens probably would have
developed a class of lawyers and jurists comparable both
in fame and attainment to the great Roman jurisconsults
and advocates.
II
While legal history is nearly always written in the setting of law courts and kings, wonder-workers and lawgivers, it really should be told in terms of the great jurists
2 Cf. Chroust, The Emergence of Professional Standards and the Legal
Profession: The Graeco-Roman Period, to be published in the near future.
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and legal practitioners. It is commonly accepted that the
courts represent a sort of officialdom which is the very life
and strength of the law. But those who really know the
innermost workings of the law recognize the fact that it is
the legal profession, the body of men learned in the law,
rather than officialdom representing the state, which constitutes a dominant-and perhaps the dominant-factor
in the law and its development. It is the members of a
professional class of highly trained and skilled men-not
officials-who in fact, are the prime creators, promoters
and administrators of the law, at least of any law which
has risen above the level of primitivism. In sum, the
emergence of a progressive, truly workable and truly
living law is closely related to the rise of a competent
legal profession which is permitted to speak in court
freely and authoritatively about matters of procedure and
law, and the proper application of the law to a given set
of facts.
This is amply illustrated by the history of Roman Law:
the grandeur that was Rome was actually the grandeur of
the Roman Law; and the grandeur of the Roman Law was
in fact the concerted achievement of the Roman legal
profession. This grandeur was not, as some historians have
tried to maintain, the product of any innate legal genius
of the Roman people. Rather it was due to the fact that
in ancient Rome the legal profession was honored. In consequence its members achieved technical proficiency, pride
of professional accomplishment and eminent social position throughout the Empire. Since early and primitive
peoples, as a rule, display a pronounced aversion to the
lawyer, this attitude of the Romans towards their legal
profession was unique. In this respect the Romans were
a mature people; and, by honoring the legal profession,
they bestowed upon the world a mature legal system: the
Roman Empire perished in time, but the Roman legal system survives to this day.

THE LEGAL PROFESSION

[Vol. XXX

From the very beginnings of Roman history the general
sociological setting from which the Roman lawyer emerged
was most favorable to the growth of a strong, competent,
public-spirited and confident legal profession. The legal
profession of ancient Rome definitely began with the Roman
priestly caste. The earliest known Roman jurists and lawyers, therefore, were the state priests, the sacerdotes publici, in whose hands rested the development, application
and interpretation, first of the sacral law, later also of the
secular law. The identification or integration of priest and
lawyer, it is important to note, indicates that we have
passed the threshold of mere custom and are approaching
the era of law, that is, the period in which some form of
organized sanction ensures compliance with the law, and
when a certain formalism has already taken hold of the
determination of certain relations.
In order to understand the legal activities of the Roman
state priests, it is essential to distinguish between the religious and the sociological functions of the Roman priest
in Roman society. The Roman state priests were not medicine men, voodoo doctors, rain-makers, soothsayers, clairvoyants or snake-dancers. Neither were they "men of
God," ordained persons or consecrated men who had
chosen a spiritual vocation and led an exemplary life. They
were, rather, men of high social standing in their community, men of noble birth (patricians) and independent
economic position. Often they had rendered the Republic
meritorious services both in war and peace; and, as a rule,
they had held, or were still holding some of the most exalted magistracies in the City, in addition to their sacerdotal rank. In short, they were wealthy and patriotic persons of an aristocratic bent of mind who were able and
willing to assume important social and political duties.
Faithful to the pontifical tradition, they considered themselves called upon to guard and perfect the law. Because
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of their nobility of character as well as origin, their unselfish devotion to the commonweal and their outstanding
achievements, they were greatly honored and highly respected by the Roman community. This fact in itself is
extremely important for the subsequent development of
the Roman legal profession as regards the high professional standards which it manifested both in its achievements and its deportment: it began as an aristocratic,
public-spirited and honored calling, pursued by patriotic
and economically independent men who by their position and experience in public life had acquired a large store
of practical knowledge and professional competence. The
aristocratic nature of the early Roman legal profession is
stressed by Quintus Mucius Scaevola when he once remarked that "it was a shameful thing for a patrician [and]
a nobleman... to be ignorant of the law under which he
lived."
IV
Roman priests, among other things, concerned themselves with the rules governing the relations of man to
God and, incidentally, with the laws affecting the relations
of man to man. They watched over the complicated
rituals, the principles which applied to vows of dedication
or consecration, the statutes dealing with sanctuaries or
special forms of worship, the burial laws and the rules
governing the declaration of war and the conclusion of
peace and international treaties, inasmuch as the latter
always were connected with solemn ritualistic oaths. They
were primarily lawyers of the sacral law, but since sacred
law frequently touched upon secular law or, at least, paralleled it, they encroached also on the domain of the secular law. During the earliest period of Roman civil or
private law there existed only a law of the family and a
law of succession. But these two branches of the secular
law traditionally adjoin sacral law. They are of decisive
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importance for purposes of the family cult in that they
determine who are members of a family and, hence, the
rightful worshipers of the divine ancestor; and who are
proper heirs expected to carry on the family worship. The
concern of the priests with these branches of private law
is thus readily understandable. And it was this concern
which subsequently led to the study and, in a sense, to
the "practice" of private law by the Roman pontiffs.
Not every priest, however, was a lawyer or jurist, although there must have been a considerable number
among them who occupied themselves vocationally with
the rules affecting either sacral matters or secular issues.
Thereby they acquired what may be styled a professional
knowledge of these rules, and a highly developed skill in
declaring, defining and applying them. Since their legal
work was really collective work or "per curiam activity,"
the individual pontiff-lawyer always remained, so to speak,
submerged by the college of priests to which he belonged
and which he represented in his various legal activities.

V
As has already been stated, one of the most important
tasks of the Roman pontiff-lawyer was to declare not only
of the sacral law, but also of the secular law. Their declarations it seems, assumed five major forms, namely: (1)
the laying down of general rules of law, such as may be
found in the so-called Laws of the Twelve Tables; (2) the
issuing of special edicts,. a practice which later was adopted
by the Roman praetor; (3) the giving of instructions as
to how certain contemplated acts must be performed in
order to be valid and binding acts; (4) the devising of
strict oral formulae for use in the acts just mentioned; and
(5) the handing down of "opinions" or declarations (responsa) on questions of either sacral or secular law. Such
opinions were strictly authoritative and, hence, were not
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argued, since they were always given on the presumption
that the alleged facts were true. The practice of giving
responsa, later also adopted by the lay jurisconsults, was
of decisive importance for the development and expansion
of Roman Law. These responsa were given either in the
nature of advice as to what actions should be taken in
order to achieve legally a desired result, and hence were
called "cautelary opinions"; or they were given in the
form of a pronouncement on the validity or legality of an
act already performed, and hence were called "judicial
opinions." As a rule they were very brief and abstained
from giving reasons.
In sacral law as well as in private law the giving of
responsa, both cautelary and judicial, was probably the
most important function of the Roman pontiff-lawyers. As
a matter of fact, this function remained for a long time
the decisive activity of the later Roman jurist-lawyers,
even after the Roman legal profession had become completely secularized. Neither in their cautelary nor in their
judicial pronouncements did they inquire into the facts
of a case: their answer always was given on the hypothesis
that the alleged facts were true. Nothing influenced the
subsequent development of Roman Law more than the
giving of responsa by which in earliest times the pontifflawyers supplied "clients" with the proper legal formulae.
In the final outcome, these formulae determined much of
the substantive Roman Law, including the appointment
of heirs and substitute heirs, disinheritance, appointment
of guardians, legacies, solemn religious marriages, marriage contracts, adoption, emancipation, certain forms of
conveyance, certain forms of parol contract, release, as
well as surety, and so forth. The whole of this vast and
varied treasure house of legal formulae, which later be,
came the Roman legal actions and, accordingly, a vital part
of Roman Law, was essentially the achievement of the
pontiff-lawyers. And all this remarkable work they ac-
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complished as mere "legal consultants."

These formulae to a large extent were the product of
rational thinking in terms of legal techniques, so characteristic of the professional lawyer. But in many instances
the pontiff-lawyers gave content as well as form to these
formulae thus making true law. As "legal consultants,"
they did not recommend to a client a form of action or a
formula, except for the purpose of devising a legally effective and valid action. If later the validity of this formula
was contested, an authoritative decision was handed down
by what we would call a "court of law." There may have
been legal argument in such a "court," particularly when
authority was pitted against authority. But, as a rule, the
pontiff-lawyers did not participate in these disputes. Usually, the authority of the pontiff-lawyer was sufficient to
secure the acceptance of any formula recommended by
him. This startling situation is well illustrated by the following incidents. Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the jurisconsult, during a famous trial emphatically appealed to the
authority of his illustrious father who, he insisted, had
always held precisely as he was holding now. And Publius
Licinius Crassus, the jurisconsult and pontifex maximus,
once had given an unfavorable responsum to a client. Dissatisfied, the client laid his problem before the orator Galba
who violently disagreed with Crassus. The latter, although
he seems to have had the worse of the argument, simply
invoked auctoritas,insisting that Publius Mucius Scaevola
and Sextus Aelius Paetus, two eminent legal authorities,
on this point of law would have held the same opinion.
Nevertheless, subsequent challenge of the adequacy of
certain formulae or forms of action in many instances led
to revision, clarification and improvement, until the formula or form of action was regarded as having achieved
the utmost legal perfection in conciseness and clarity. In
any legal dispute authority counted heavily, and particular importance was attached, by way of precedent, to the
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responsa of the jurist-lawyers or jurisconsults of established repute. For did not the orator Lucius Licinius Crassus contend that "in our commonwealth . . . men of the

highest esteem and renown..., having attained eminence
by their talents, are thereby enabled to give legal advice
which carries weight rather on account of their authoritative position than of their talents."
The strict formalism or ritualism that was part of the
sacral law affected also the secular or private law insofar
as the latter adjoined the sacral law. Hence an "expert"
in matters of formalism, usually a pontiff, had to assist at
the performance of certain sacral acts. And since some of
these sacral acts were definitely legal consequences in the
modern sense of the term, as in the domain of family law
or the law of succession, this assistance amounted to a
kind of "legal aid." Failure to comply with certain forms
or to pronounce the correct formulae could make a whole
act or transaction null and void.
As a rule, the pontiff-lawyer, at least in matters of private or secular law, did not perform as a judge, nor even
as an advocate in the later sense of the term, that is, as
the representative or legal advisor or spokesman of a
litigant in court. He merely instructed him as to what he
had to do and what he had to avoid. From this activity,
which was called respondere (and cavere), as well as from
the fact that he was consulted on matters of law, he derived his later name, which was also applied to lay practitioners, namely, that of jurisconsultus or jurisconsult.
VI
During the middle period of the Roman Republican era
the practice of law gradually passed into the hands of
laymen. This occurred in response to the ever increasing
need for a variety of legal assistance. It was probably the
moral duty of assistance owed by a Roman patrician or
aristocrat (patronus) to his "client" (a sort of vassal) in
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virtue of his wealth and position, which ushered in the
practice of law by laymen. For the origin and meaning
of the terms patronus and "client," terms which are so
important for an understanding of the subsequent development of the Roman legal profession, one has to go
back to the beginnings of the Roman social and political
structure: patronus referred to a powerful patrician who
assumed a protective attitude toward certain people, namely, "clients," who had put themselves under the protection
of his clan. In the course of time this protection became
professionalized; it was taken on by professional men who,
without having any relation to the "client," openly espoused his cause. When a patrician began to advise and
defend not only his own "clients" but also other people
who sought his help, he was no longer simply a patronus
but a patronus causarum-

a real lawyer.

According to the best tradition, the first outstanding lay
lawyers appeared around the year 200 B.C. This secularization of the Roman legal profession, however, had little,
if any, immediate effect upon the growth and development
of the profession for these laymen came from the same
social stratum as the pontiffs. Hence the general character
and trend of Roman legal practice remained unaffected
by this gradual secularization. Sacred, public and private
law alike were still developed and expanded by a relatively
small and extremely exclusive group of men who formed
a socially and economically homogeneous class. Thus, even
after the practice of law, particularly the expanding secular law, had been taken over by laymen, the Roman
legal profession remained for a long time a predominantly
aristocratic profession. The secular lawyers simply adopted
the standards of performance and deportment which had
characterized the earlier pontiff-lawyers. The Roman legal
profession was still a gentleman's profession based primarily on character and breeding which considered itself
to be the guardian and promoter of the law rather than

1954]

IN ANCIENT REPUBLICAN ROME

the partisan of a particular cause or a special interest.
Probably the most outstanding achievement of the Roman
legal profession of this period consisted in the fact that it
constantly created and modified the law. In this the Roman
jurist-lawyers displayed a concerted effort of preserving
the law from "perversion" as well as from becoming petrified and sterile. Especially during the Roman Republican
period, the Roman legal profession derived from its aristocratic exponents a dignity which is without peer in the
annals of Western history. Coming from the most respected
and wealthiest Roman families, which had always supplied
Rome with its best and most devoted public servants, the
lawyer-jurists imparted to their work and to the whole
profession a distinct atmosphere which found its most
telling expression in the observance of a dignified and
disciplined conduct. Their motto was: Melius est virtute
ius - "High above all human virtues stands the law."
The Roman legal profession started out as an aristocratic
calling, based on honor and character; it was regarded as
a sort of stern public service; and it was pursued by the
same men who held, or had held, the most distinguished
positions in the Republic.
But a word of caution may be appropriate here: the
term "aristocrat" is used in this connection in a special
sense. It connotes, above all, a stern attitude, a deep seated
sense of duty and a high conception of honor which also
includes an instinct for what is right and what is wrong. In
antiquity, due to historical circumstances, such traits of
character were frequently associated with the advantages
of birth and wealth. But these advantages in themselves
were not the sole or even the true hallmark of the aristocrat, although under ancient social conditions they were
factors often conducive to aristocratic deportment- that
is, to manifestations of aristocratic traits of character.

VII
The early Roman lay jurist-lawyer, then, was really
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nothing other than the patrician patronus of old, whose
clientele had become rather wide; and the early Roman
lay jurisconsult was nothing else than the descendant of
the legal (priestly) sage of old, who not only gave legal
advice and legal assistance to private parties, but also
instructed magistrates (later even emperors), especially
judicial magistrates, in all important matters of law. In
this fashion he also acquired a decisive influence on the
further development and expansion of Roman Law.
The early Roman legal profession, both priestly and lay,
was also what may be called an impersonal profession. The
strong esprit de corps which permeated this small group
of jurist-lawyers imposed uniformity of highest performance and irreproachable conduct. Thanks to the active
and intelligent part which the Roman jurist-lawyer played
in the growth of Roman law, the latter became a distinct
"lawyer's law" - that is, an eminently progressive and
truly workable law, the like of which the world would
not see again for centuries to come. This law was not
"taught law," for the teaching of law had no attraction for
the early Roman jurist-lawyer. Instruction in the law was
acquired by association and observation, particularly
since the responsa of the jurisconsults frequently were
given in public. It was what may be called an "authoritative law"; for although the jurist-lawyers relied on reasoning, they based their practice mostly on previous decisions
or responsa, that is, on the authority of other juristlawyers. Insisting on feeling their way from concrete case
to concrete case, the early Roman jurist-lawyers refused
to commit themselves in advance by predicting the outcome of a litigation on the basis of some abstract principle.
At the same time, they also displayed a marked aversion
to legislation or statutory law which was prevented, as
much as possible, from intruding into the domain of the
"lawyer's law". This particular attitude manifested a determination characteristic of the aristocracy of the early
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Roman legal profession: to keep a firm hand on the law
and its development. And since the aristocrat does not
work for money, the early Roman jurist-lawyer went unpaid for his services. It was from these noble exponents
that the Roman Law derived a dignity and authority which
determined its entire development. Obviously, such a class
of honorable and professionally competent men maintained
the highest professional standards.
VIII
In its long and distinguished history, the legal profession of ancient Republican Rome, particularly after its
secularization, was called upon, as it has been elsewhere,
to perform fundamentally only four major services, namely: (1) to give legal advice as well as answer questions of
law (including procedure), whether for the benefit of
private parties, magistrates or novices who desired to
aquire a knowledge of the law; (2) to draw up legal
documents of all sorts; (3) to represent parties in initiating
legal action and in carrying out the various steps in the
complicated Roman legal procedure required prior to
the actual trial; and (4) to plead a case before the courts
in behalf of a client. This latter service, however, at least
after the year 200 B.C., was performed not so much by
the jurisconsults as by "forensic orators". As a matter of
fact, the advent of the forensic orator marks the point in
Roman legal history when the jurisconsults, who were
never too anxious to become embroiled in actual litigation,
nearly withdrew from pleading in the courts.
A person contemplating the bringing of an action went
before the praetor or his substitute, who was by no means
identical with our judge, and pointed out the particular
provision in the law on which he proposed to base his
action. The defendant then made an appearance before
the praetor and indicated what provisions of the law he
intended to rely upon for his defense. This stage of Roman
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civil procedure, which was held before the judicial magistrate, was called the stage in jure. Its purpose was to frame
and agree on the issues to be tried in the second stage, the
stage in judicio. The latter was held before a trier (judex)
or triers who were often private persons chosen as arbitrators (during the Empire the judex became an official).
During the stage in jure there could be a kind of hearing
as to whether the action proposed by the plaintiff should
be allowed. If it was allowed, the judicial magistrate, often
with the advice of a jurisconsult, would settle the procedural formula and then issue a set of instructions for
the trier. These instructions contained what we would call
the pleadings of the parties as well as some definite directions as to what judgement should be rendered in case
certain issues were found or not found. When the procedural formula was finally settled, the parties joined in a
sort of procedural contract by agreeing to abide by this
formula and submit it to the trier whose judgment was
binding on them by virtue of the procedural contract.
The proceedings in jure in particular, with their highly
technical aspects, demanded much skill, experience and
a good deal of legal knowledge possessed only by a professional man. A person not thoroughly versed in the law
was likely to find himself without the proper remedy or
form of action, unless he had the advice or assistance of
an expert or, even better, unless some professionally experienced person would make the application to the judicial magistrate on his behalf. Moreover, the ever increasing complexity of legal, social, political and economic conditions in Rome, made it necessary as a practical matter
that a litigant be advised or represented by a competent
lawyer. And Roman legal practice, as we know it, not only
permitted but actually encouraged every litigant to avail
himself of the services of a lawyer. The need for legal
representation was further increased by the steadily growing size of the Roman territory. The litigant might reside
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at a considerable distance from Rome and find it difficult,
if not impossible, to be personally present at the proceedings either in jure or in judicio. This fact further increased
ihe need for legal representation, a need which was met by
the practice of appointing a "lawyer-agent" or representative. In this the Romans held a unique position among
other ancient peoples who, as a rule, required that the
litigant personally appear in court and plead his own case.
For among primitive peoples no one was allowed to name
another person to act on his behalf.
IX
The appointment of a lawyer-agent in Rome required,
at least in earlier times, a definite technique. Early Roman
Law lacked the modern conception of agency; and since
it was held that what the agent did could not be regarded
as having been done by the principal, a curious situation
arose. It was held that what the agent did, he did not for
the principal but for himself. Hence the agent had to agree
by special contract that the benefits of what he did should
inure to his principal. The principal, on the other hand,
had to enter into a special contract to reimburse the agent
for all losses and expenditures incurred by him while
working for the principal, provided, the agent acted in
good faith. As a result of this peculiar situation, the judgment was always in favor of one attorney and against the
other attorney. But, as has been stated, there was a contractual and actionable duty on: the part of the lawyeragent to account for and transfer to his principal whatever
he reco- ered, as there was a contractual and actionable
obligation on the part of the principal to indemnify the
agent in case of an adverse decision. This had to be done
by a special proceeding however. At a later. date, due to
some important legal reforms, the law provided for the
automatic transfer of the judgment to or against the real
parties to the litigation. But it was probably not until
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the time of Cicero (first half of the first century B.C.) that
a judgment in a civil action against the lawyer-agent directly affected the principal. When this happened, the
Roman agent for litigation became a true attorney.
Roman Law knew two methods of appointing a lawyeragent for litigation, namely, the formal and older mode
and the informal and newer method. Except for persons
expressly prohibited by law or, to be more exact, by
praetorian edict, anyone could be appointed to act as the
representative of a party involved in litigation. The formal
appointment created the cognitor who had to be appointed
by the litigant by a strict formula in the presence of the
adversary as a matter of record. The person appointed
cognitor might be either present or absent, but if absent
he had to give his consent and undertake the representation. This mode of appointment soon became obsolete. The
lawyer-agent who was appointed informally was called
a procurator.The informal appointment was usually done
by way of verbal instructions and could be done without
knowledge of the opposing party. All the procuratorhad
to do was to act in good faith for his principal and see to
it that the latter ratified whatever he did. Thanks to his
informal appointment he could initiate proceedings without producing his "power of attorney" or the instructions
which he had received from his principal. Only in the
action in judicio, that is, in the hearing before a trier,
could the procurator be compelled to produce these instructions. In addition, at least during the greater part
of the Republican period, his appearance in behalf of a
client could be challenged by the adversary on the ground
s On rare occasions, it seems, women were permitted to plead in a Roman
court. Tradition has it, for instance, that Amaesia Sentia, apparently a lady
of much ability, defended herself so successfully in an action brought against
her that the court found in her favor. Afrania, the wife of the senator Licinius
Buccio, seems to have been a quarrelsome and impertinent person who had a
knack of constantly getting herself into legal troubles. This lady frequently
came forward in the Roman courts in order to advocate her own causes. But
she had such an unpleasant voice and so unattractive a manner that her
performances were often compared to those of a "yelping bitch."
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that he was incompetent to plead for or represent a party
because he was a person of bad character, or under seventeen years of age, or a woman,3 or a slave, or a soldier on
active service or a blind or deaf person.
X
While the legal profession of early Republican Rome
gradually seems to have concerned itself with nearly all
phases of legal assistance, from a technical point of view
it was still a very primitive profession as regards its practices and ideas. Hence the term "legal profession" can be
applied to it only in a very loose sense. No one intending
to practice law needed a license or had to attend a law
school or undergo any sort of organized instruction in the
law. As a matter of fact, in early Rome there was no such
thing as a law school or a regular course in legal instruction. The jurisconsults, believing that any form of systematic (and remunerative) teaching Was beneath their dignity, disdained giving formal instruction in the law. The
pontiff-lawyers in the priestly colleges learned the sacral
as well as the secular law by constant observation and
imitation, and by association with their more experienced
colleagues. Especially ambitious men could always consult
the pontifical archives. The lay lawyers acquired their
knowledge of the law in the same way as did the pontifflawyers. Also, since some of the responsa of the jurisconsults were given in public, it was possible for a young
man interested in a legal career to attend the consultations
at which, these responsa were given and thereby acquaint
himself with the intricacies of the law. By observing the
manner in which experts dealt with concrete issues rather
than with abstract doctrines or theories, he learned the
great art of mediating between life and logic within the
framework of concrete reality.
During the latter days of the Roman Republic, a student
of the law, on leaving school where he might have picked
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up some elementary information about the law, attached
himself to a famous jurisconsult who happened to be a
friend of the family. Entering the household of his new
master or preceptor, he lived with him and his family
(and sometimes even married one of his daughters). At
his new home he attended the consultations which his
master gave to clients who called on him personally seeking legal advice. Several times a week he accompanied
his master to the Forum and closely watched him perform
there, either as a jurisconsult or counsel giving judicial
or cautelary responsa, or as a member of the praetor's
(or trier's) council giving professional counsel to these
judicial officers, or as an advisor to a litigant in proceedings in jure or in judicio. After the day's work was done
he joined the informal circle of the family and, in the
course of general conversation, listened to his master reminiscing about his own experiences at the bar or those of
some friends or colleagues. In this fashion he absorbed,
through closest contact with actual practice and professional tradition, the spirit of the Roman Law and how it
worked. Naturally, he might also study some treatises on
law, if such were available, and perhaps discuss with his
master some particularly difficult or baffling point. Thus,
from the very beginning, the student became acquainted
with the law through actual contact with the law in action.
The dominant problem which was constantly impressed
upon him was this: In the light of the alleged facts, what
ought to be done at law? By intimate association with
actual legal combat, he learned the art of dealing with
concrete cases. This kind of legal training was essentially
aristocratic; and, as a rule, the Roman jurisconsult, but
not always the forensic orator, faithfully adhered to this
tradition until the very end of the Republic.
Admission to the Bar or, as the Romans said, "introduction to the Forum," was considered a solemn and important event. The candidate put aside his boyish garb
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and assumed the dress of a man (toga virilis). Attended by
a festive company of friends and well-wishers, he would
proceed to the Forum where so often the destiny of Rome,
Italy and the whole Mediterranean world was debated and
decided. After a formal presentation by some distinguished
person, who vouched for his character, he was officially
introduced as a practitioner in the law courts. Having been
thus admitted to the Bar, the young man could at once
begin to practice law as an advocate. Tradition has it that
M. Aurelius Cotta initiated his sensational legal proceedings against C. Papirius Carbo the very day of his introduction to the Forum.
XI
Except for the close association in the different priestly
colleges, there was nothing like a professional organization
of lay lawyers or a guild of professionally trained men
with its own standards, professional code of ethics and
distinct policies. Very few, if any, Rbmans seem to have
devoted themselves exclusively to the practice of law. As
already indicated, the practive of law originally was an
avocation followed by some noble and wealthy men not
for gain but rather for honor. At least during the early
Republic, it was regarded as a sort of stern public service
that could not be engaged in for money; and the main
duties of the aristocratic Roman lawyer were considered
a public function.
As. time went on, the trend towards secularization of
the Roman legal profession grew more pronounced: the
number of lay jurists and lawyers became increasingly
larger, and laymen began to concern themselves even with
sacral law. As a result, the Roman legal profession expanded considerably but, at the same time, lost some of
its original uniformity, cohesiveness and esprit de corps.
The pontiff-lawyers, nevertheless, were still prominent as
legal advisors both in the domain of sacral and secular
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law. On the whole, however, they gradually began withdrawing from the practice of secular law, and this for a
good reason: secular law had developed quite rapidly and
thus had become so complicated as to rule out the mere
dilettante.
Also, around the year 200 B.C. the influence of Hellenistic notions concerning professionalism and learning
made themselves felt in Rome. Under the influence of
Epicurean teachings,4 these novel ideas counselled specialization but, at the same time, complete withdrawal from
active political life. This stimulated the growth of a new
type of legal practitioners who no longer regarded themselves as the guardians and promoters of the law. The new
men, as a rule, still came from the best Roman families
and were still animated by the ideals of impeccable conduct
and high professional achievement. But in order to dedicate themselves more completely to the pursuit of law
and its practice (which by now had become a very lucrative occupation), they rarely, if ever, assumed a high
political office, thus manifesting an incipient attitude of
political indifferentism. And this attitude was fostered by
the profound changes in Rome's political history which
were gradually converting the old Republic into an absolute military monarchy. Conversely, the lack of civicmindedness. on the part of many jurist-lawyers and legal
practitioners undoubtedly contributed to the steady advance of absolutist political ideas. Did not Cicero later
complain: "When the sound of civil war is heard, our
profession becomes conspicuously mute."
This new type of lay lawyers, as has already been mentioned, practiced mainly as legal consultants or jurisconsuts; they gave judicial or cautelary responses or assisted
the judicial magistrates through their professional advice.
On the whole, they abstained from pleading in the courts,
4 Cf. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of the Epicureans, 26 THoMnST 82117 and 217-267, especially 83 ff.
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however, leaving advocacy to the newly rising class of
forensic orators. Only on rare occasions did they make an
appearance in court, and then only when a particularly
involved point of law was raised, or when an especially
important case was litigated, or when a notorious person
was tried. These lawyers, who still adhered to the old
aristocratic traditions, as a rule worked gratuitously.
A further class of lawyers or legal practitioners soon
made its appearance who apparently came from humbler
and less wealthy families. Being without independent
means of their own and probably lacking the right political
or social connections, they abandoned the aristocratic notion of providing their services gratuitously; they demanded-and received-ample remuneration for their efforts
in behalf of clients.
XH
The Hellenistic notions which gradually affected many
aspects of the old Roman way of life, introduced into the
formerly laconic and austere Roman legal practice the
art of forensic oratory with all the abuses that once upon
a time had turned Athenian trials into mere oratorical contests. This novel vogue produced a new class of legal practitioners referred to by their contemporaries as oratores or
advocati. Though possessed of a modicum of legal knowledge, they were essentially nothing but spelbinders and
pettifoggers. Few of them mastered law sufficiently to qualify as jurisconsults. As a matter of fact, these "acrobats in
eloquence," as Quintilian called them, had to resort to
jurisconsults for advice and counsel in order to grasp the
basic legal issues involved in the cases they argued before
the courts. The term "advocate" or advocatus, however,
was not generally applied to a forensic orator until the
time of Cicero or, perhaps, even later.
Originally the term "advocate" meant a friend who by
his presence in court gave support and countenance to the
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litigant, particularly to a defendant in criminal proceedings. It was always a matter of vital importance that a
person charged with the commission of a crime should
appear at his trial with as many friends and partisans as
possible. This practice had a dual purpose. First, a large
number of friends indicated to the court that the defendant
was really a good man, beloved by many. These friends,
who often remained completely mute, therefore in effect
were silent character witnesses. Secondly, a large number
of friends, particularly if they were persons of great importance, might impress and even intimidate the court and,
hence, secure a favorable verdict for the defendant.
The Latin term orator once had a much more extensive
application than it has today. The Romans called all those
people orators who made it a profession to speak in public,
either in the popular assembly or in the Senate or in the,
courts of law. Hence all advocates, as distinguished from
jurisconsults or jurist-lawyers, were orators, and Cicero
constantly referred to the advocate as orator. In ancient
Rome, moreover, no line of demarcation existed between
the forensic orator and the politician. Cicero, for instance,
was both, and it is often difficult to determine whether in
his speeches to the court he was representing a client or
whether he was addressing himself to matters of general
concern. By frequent appearances in behalf of clients,
especially if they included famous persons, an eloquent
forensic orator often acquired a popularity which brought
him favorably to the attention of the people and often
started him on an illustrious political career. Thus Cicero
began as an orator and ended by holding the highest magistracy in Republican Rome, the consulship in the year 63
B.C.
XIII
In order .to appreciate the dominant role which this
class of forensic orators began to play not only within the
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Roman legal profession itself, but also in the whole administration of justice, it will be helpful to say a few words
about Roman procedure. During the Republican period an
accused found guilty in criminal proceedings before a
judicial magistrate could appeal to the popular assembly
where he was tried anew by the sovereign people of Rome.
Not all charges, however, were heard by judicial magistrates in the first instance, and not all appeals were heard
by the people. In some cases the defendant was tried,
either originally or on appeal, by a tribunal consisting of
thirty-two to seventy-five judices who were by no means
always professionally trained and experienced judges in
our sense of the term. More often than not they were
laymen appointed for the particular case. Both of these
procedures afforded ample opportunity for the display of
oratory and persuasion, intended to sway these "mass
juries" through appeals to sentiment, prejudice, fear and
frustration.
In the proceedings in judicio, that is, at the actual trial
of civil suits, similar conditions often prevailed. After the
legal issues had been settled by the praetor in the preliminary proceedings in jure, evidence could be introduced
during the proceedings in judicio. This was followed by
lengthy speeches on both sides; or each side could introduce evidence in the course of one or several speeches; or
the speech or speeches of each side could be followed by
the introduction of evidence; or there might be one or
several speeches for the plaintiff and one or several
speeches by the defendant, followed by the introduction
of evidence and then by more speeches by way of summing
up; or the litigant might open the proceedings by speaking
for himself and have one or several orators "relieve" him.
In short, there were no set rules in such matters, and the
distinction between evidence, argument, rebuttal and summation was not clearly drawn. In any event, there was
always opportunity for plenty of speech making.
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For some time there seems to have been no limit on
the number of lawyers or advocates that could be retained,
although it was unusual for a client to engage more than
four lawyers in a case. We are told, for instance, that
Scaurus was defended by no less than six advocates Clodius Pulcher, Marcellus, Callidius, Messala Niger,
Hortensius and Cicero the most prominent forensic
orators of their day. Besides this formidable array of oratorical talent, Scaurus spoke in his own behalf, and by his
earnest appeal to compassion succeeded in being acquitted.
Later a statute was enacted which limited the number of
advocates a man might retain. This was done in order to
prevent an undue preponderance of legal counsel on either
side, thereby depriving the other side of adequate representation.
Whenever a client availed himself of the services of more
than one advocate, it was presumed that each of them
would take up one or more of the several issues at bar.
But in practice it occurred quite frequently that they had
been poorly briefed in advance or had failed to reach an
understanding among themselves as to how the task should
properly be divided. Thus it happened that one orator
would exhaust all the arguments, leaving the next speaker
without a subject. In his defense of Murena, for instance,
Cicero complained of the serious difficulties he encountered
when he was co-counsel with Crassus and Hortensius.
These two lawyers, he laments, had so thoroughly disposed
of all real issues that there was nothing left for him to
argue. Advocates were thus frequently compelled to cover
again and again the same ground that had already been
gone over. Critical issues, on the other hand, were often
not dealt with at all, each of the advocates expecting the
others to do so. Furthermore, the various speeches frequently had no connection with one another. Obviously,
such conditions were ideal from the.point of view of shallow and verbose rhetoric which threatened to replace law
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and the effective administration of justice.
Originally, there also seems to have been no time limit
imposed on the forensic orators. Judging from the notorious
trial of Bassus which took place during the latter part of
the first century A.D., we may assume that, in the days
of Republican Rome, the trial of an important person
charged with a sensational crime often consumed much
time. In the affair of Bassus two forensic orators, Pomponius Rufus and Theophanes, stated the case against the
defendant. This took several hours. Then Pliny rose for
the defense and spoke for five hours. He was followed by
Lucius Albinus who also took many hours. Then Hercanius
Pollio spoke at great length for the prosecution. When
Pollio was finally exhausted, Theophanes, apparently having regained his breath, resumed the argument for the
prosecution. After that it was decided to adjourn. Next
day Titius, Homulo and Fronto addressed the court on
behalf of the defense, and only then was evidence heard.
No wonder that such practices had to be curtailed. During
the middle of the first century B.C., the water-glass was
occasionally introduced to control the length of the
speeches. When the water-glass had run out, the advocate
was asked to sit down. It appears that the presiding judicial magistrate determined beforehand the amount of time
he would allow to each side for speeches by measuring the
amount of water in the glass or by fixing the size of the
latter.
XIV
Unlike the forensic orator, the dignified Roman juristlawyer, in keeping with his aristocratic attitude towards
every form of public service, looked contemptuously on
verbosity and oratory, a fact which is still reflected in the
terse and accurate diction of Roman Law. In his speech
he was factual, brief to the point of being cryptic, and,
in contrast to the lively and excitable Greek, even un-
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imaginative. This austere attitude was not only considered
outmoded, inferior and even harmful; indeed, it was widely
ridiculed by the forensic orators. It was suggested, for
instance, that the jurisconsults were laconic because they
lacked the superior art of oratory and thus were compelled
to make a virtue of their shortcomings. A thorough knowledge of the law was considered definitely non-essential, in
fact, beneath the dignity of a true forensic orator. Some
of these orators went so far as to reject all legal studies,
claiming that they cramped the orator's style and diction.
There were a few exceptions, however; some orators acquired a fair command of the law by intense study and
application.
These dissimilarities disassociated the old-type juristlawyer from the forensic orator of the last century of the
Republic and had a deleterious effect upon the professional
deportment of the latter. The old aristocratic jurist-lawyer
had a strong esprit de corps which, among other things,
effectively guaranteed high professional standards of
achievement as well as of deportment. Among the forensic
orators this powerful check was lacking. A low and unscrupulous type of legal practitioner made its appearance
a type, that is, which is always apt to develop from the
increasing need of representation due to the growing volume of litigation and the opportunity thus afforded for
preying on the ignorant and extorting from the timid.
Needless to say, many of the sordid practices to which the
forensic orators frequently resorted were imported from
Greece where they had flourished for some time.
As a class, therefore, the forensic orators did much to
degrade, despoil and vulgarize the Roman legal profession.
Although a series of praetorian edicts provided that only
persons of good moral character were to be admitted to
the practice of law, on the whole these enactments were
ineffective. Thus a party was always permitted, by way
of a dilatory plea, to challenge the character of the oppos-
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ing lawyer. But this device accomplished little. As a matter of fact, it often resulted in the hilarious situation where
the proverbial kettle calls the pot black. Mutual vituperations, are perhaps amusing to an irresponsible audience,
but are not an effective check upon unethical legal practitioners.
One of the reasons for the deterioration of the Roman
legal profession, aside from the general moral decline of
Roman society and Roman politics that set in during the
later part of the second century B.C., may have been the
fact that the forensic orators received ample remuneration
for their legal services. This became a lure for many incompetent people whose greed exceeded their ability and
character. Tacitus had a few harsh words to say about the
sad state of Roman advocacy. According to him, the real
cause for this decline was the "modern" mothers of Rome
who in their inordinate love of pleasure turn over the upbringing and education of their children to worthless
slaves and fawning tutors. The latter constantly defer to
every whim of the child. As a result, children are never
taught discipline and good study habits. Moreover, instead
of being inculcated at an early age with the basic principles
of right and wrong by their parents, the children are
taught by their nursemaids and tutors the ways of villainy,
including greed, deception and flattery. Thus spoiled from
early childhood, they grow up in idleness, ignorance and
vice. The hope of reaping ample rewards without much
effort attracts many of these 'youths to the practice
of law. But they are ill-prepared and even less qualified
for a legal career, and in the end they only succeed in debasing the legal profession.
Confronted by the ruthless competition of the forensic
orator, and having no desire to imitate his shallow excursions into mere verbosity or his frequently unscrupulous
methods of rabble-rousing and petifogging, the aristocratic jurist-lawyer gradually withdrew from the practice
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of law. Resolved to remain faithful to the pontifical tradition of being the guardian and promoter of the law, he
simply refused to court popularity by resorting to the new
methods introduced by Hellenistic rhetoric. Thus it came
about that during the latter days of the Republic the
forensic orator or advocate gained great prominence or, at
least, much notoriety. Perhaps this was inevitable. In a
legal system in which popular courts dominated, and the
quest for reparation for injury seems to have been the
major legal issue, the forensic orator was bound to be
more conspicuous and perhaps even more effective than
the technical jurist. In addition, in a society which had
come to love dramatics and verbal combat, the forensic
orator provided many a public spectacle and certainly
better entertainment than the stern jurisconsult and his
responsa.

Nevertheless, the jurisconsult was still a vital and influential part of the Roman legal profession and his influence was strongly felt both in a technical and moral sense.
This contributed much to maintaining a professional level
of accomplishment which, notwithstanding the practices of
the forensic orators, remained, on the whole, fairly high.
He did much to preserve the great esteem in which the
profession was held. That he withstood the unhealthy
practices introduced by forensic orators is to his everlasting credit. For in doing so he preserved what was truly
profound in the tradition not only of the Roman legal profession, but of Roman Law itself, which was destined to
become the law of the civilized world.
xv
The most outstanding or, at any rate, the best known
representative of the class of forensic orators or advocates
was probably Cicero, a verbose though persuasive rhetorician whose legal competence never rose above the level
of mediocrity. Tradition has called him "the monarch of
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the Forum" and the "leader of the Roman Bar," descriptions which can be accepted only with important reservations. In his youth he received legal instruction from some
of the most outstanding jurist-lawyers of his time, although it appears that he retained little of the legal wisdom
which his teachers imparted to him. He was extremely
proud of his profession and applied himself to his work
with great zeal. He said about himself that he devoted all
his time to study and to the many duties of his calling in
order that he might be better prepared for the practice of advocacy. Since his many labors debarred him from the less
strenuous enjoyments of life, he maintained that he found
his recreation in his work, asserting that he owed his
phenomenal success "to much toil and many perils." He
insisted that his elevation to the highest Roman magistracy,
the consulship in the year 63 B.C., was due to his success
as a forensic orator and advocate.
Thus, according to his own account, Cicero read much
and studied continuously. In order to accustom himself
to accurate and concise thinking, he devoted part of each
day to writing, insisting that by writing on a subject he
had to pay more than ordinary attention to the finer points
of his subject. In addition, he would become used to the
employment of the most appropriate words and most pleasing sentences, as well as turn his attention upon stylistic
niceties and the proper arrangement of his thoughts. He
maintained that a lawyer, thus accustomed to this sort of
mental discipline, would always speak with correctness
and grace.
Aside from his preoccupation with law, Cicero studied
philosophy under Philo and logic under the Stoic Diodorus;
and, in order to prepare himself for his future career as
a forensic orator, took lessons in rhetoric from Molo the
Rhodian, who himself had been a famous advocate. All
this tends to show that Cicero aspired to a wide and varied
education. He himself said that he spent three full years
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studying night and day until his health nearly gave away.
It was his favorite theory that there were no limits to the
knowledge a successful advocate had to possess, and he
once declared that the perfect lawyer is a man who can
speak competently and interestingly on all subjects. In
this he seems to have been the champion of the idea that
there is no part of human knowledge of which a competent
lawyer should be ignorant: "I will pronounce him to be
a complete and perfect lawyer who can speak on all subjects with variety and fullness." No wonder that some of
the more outstanding Roman jurist-lawyers and even some
of the forensic orators, including Cicero himself, displayed
a wide and varied intellectual interest, ranging from philosophy to finance, from poetry to scientific agriculture. And
not a few Roman historians of great repute were also
famous lawyers, such as Livy and Tacitus.
Unfortunately, Cicero's main interests did not lie with
technical legal studies, to which any serious lawyer has
to subject himself, but rather with rhetoric and grandiloquious spellbinding. Until his death he manifested a
deep-seated dislike, not to say, distrust of the finer points
of the law. The caustic remark, made by a famous Roman
wit: "Never have I seen the fine furniture of legal science
among the inventory of a forensic orator," could certainly
be applied to Cicero. Concentration on law and the study
of law he regarded as the hall-mark of the dullard; to him
oratorical fluency was the first and noblest art in Rome,
law only the second. He loved to point out that legal opinions and decisions are frequently upset by a clever address
given by a capable advocate: "The faculty of speaking is
a great and dignified attribute which has often turned the
scales .... Great, indeed, is it to be able, by means of
persuasive eloquence, to sway the . . . courts." Then he
goes on denouncing the jurist-lawyer and exalting the forensic orator: "I like [a man] who goes forth to the Forum
or the Camp of Mars, full of hope, spirit and resourceful-
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ness. I disapprove of working up the legal technicalities
of a case..., the sure road to defeat." Hence he insisted
that the study of law need not constitute a vital part in
the training of an advocate.
Apparently the maxims laid down by Cicero were faithfully observed by the majority of the Roman forensic orators or advocates who, at best, had only a scanty knowledge
of the law, barely sufficient to enable them to understand
the legal issues in the cases they handled or to follow the
technical advice they had solicited from the jurisconsults.
Thus Mark Antony, the grandfather of the notorious lover
of Cleopatra, maintained that the study of law was absolutely useless to the advocate. He is said to have had hardly
any knowledge of the law. As a matter of fact, tradition
has it that he was not only completely ignorant of the law,
but gloried in his ignorance. The historian Tacitus, himself
a lawyer of great repute, complained that, during the latter
days of the Republic, people intending to become advocates
often displayed an attitude of open contempt for a thorough study of the law, pretending that a knowledge of the
law was something entirely unnecessary and even harmful
for the successful pursuit of their calling.
XVI
In the final analysis, the forensic orators or advocates
acquired the art of advocacy, as distinguished from the
technique of giving responsa, chiefly from Greek or Hellensic teachers or manuals on rhetoric. Hence, in a way,
they were profoundly Hellenized; they were more Greek
than Roman; and it is not surprising that Cicero, who had
studied, though superficially, certain Greek authors,
should be more valuable to us as a secondary source of
Hellenistic philosophy than as a fountainhead of Roman
jurisprudence. Naturally, the forensic orators adapted
their Greek models and their often inadequate knowledge
of Greek jurisprudence to Roman conditions. In particu-
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lar, as can be gathered from the chatty Cicero, they took
from Greek forensic rhetoric and Greek philosophy certain concepts and notions which were alien to Roman Law
and Roman jurisprudence such as the concept of natural
law (ius naturae or ius naturale). This is nothing other
than a loose translation and practical adaptation of the

Greek

PHYSEI DIKEION.

Another example is the concept

of "the unwritten law" (ius non scriptum) which was

meant to be the equivalent of the Greek

NOMOS AGRAPHOS.

The Republican jurist-lawyers or jurisconsults, on the
other hand, took little notice of and showed no interest in
Greek ideas or conceptions. Although some of them, such
as Publius Rutilius Rufus, Quintus Aelius Tubero, Quintus
Mucius Scaevola, the pontiff, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the
augur, Servius Balbus, and Servius Sulpicius Rufus had
come into contact with Greek or Hellenistic philosophy, in
their professional activities, they were little influenced by
speculative theories concerning the law. They did not philosophize about the nature of the "ideal law" or about the
meaning of justice. And while they had some vague notion about a natural law, they did not reflect upon it seriously. Neither did they pay much attention to the problems of interpretation, definition, classification and
analysis, or to questions of comparative law and legal history. At no time did they suggest that law should be approached from a philosophical or sociological standpoint.
Lofty speculation, like jurisprudence or legal philosophy,
was alien to their tradition and temperament. In their
strong sense for sober realities they were interested only
in the actually existing law: it was the concrete problems
of existential life and the stark realities of a complex social
reality which preoccupied them.
Socially, most of the forensic orators came from humbler
and poorer families, a fact of which they were keenly
aware. They certainly did not try, and perhaps could not
afford, to follow the noble example set by the jurist-law-
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yers and jurisconsults who, in a spirit of aristocraticidealistic and patriotic-civic-mindedness, served private
clients as well as the public free of charge.
Quite frequently, the forensic orators, who had become
habitual legal practitioners, were also persons of a low type
and inferior character. The fact that Roman criminal procedure permitted the defendant to appeal a court sentence to the popular assembly afforded the forensic orator
ample opportunity to display publicly a vast repertoire of
showmanship. It was here that he could indulge in dramatics and antics of all sorts without having to resort to
the law. Indeed, the assembly frequently seems to have
judged on the basis of the oratorical performance of the
litigant or his advocate.
XVII
The dramatics in which the forensic orators loved to
indulge, included the abundant use of the invective, falsehood, distortion of fact, and flattery, as well as the impassioned appeal to fear, resentment or sentiment. Such tactics had a calculated purpose, the full extent of which can
be understood only if one realizes the following: In Republican Rome, as in Athens, the assmbled people, being
sovereign as well as extremely jealous of their sovereignty,
constituted a court of last appeal in all judicial matters.
As such they acted not only as judge and jury, but, consciously or unconsciously, they considered themselves at
liberty to pardon as well as to convict. In sum, they regarded themselves both as a court of justice and as a board
of pardon. They felt that they had not merely to try
simple issues of guilt or innocence, that is, questions concerned with the investigation of facts and the application
of the law to the facts as found. Particularly in criminal
proceedings the people insisted that they were representing the Roman commonwealth against which the alleged
criminal offense had been committed. It was in keeping
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with this attitude that they considered themselves competent to remit the punishment imposed by law. This
being so, the people often thought it unnecessary first to
go through the technical process of convicting the defendant and then to pardon him in a separate procedure. They
chose to adopt the shorter and more spectacular process
of sentencing and pardoning the defendant in one single
act after having listened for hours to impassioned appeals
to mercy rather than to legal reasoning. Hence it goes
without saying that an acquittal was not always tantamount to a verdict of "not guilty"; it did not signify that
the defendant was considered innocent of the charge. It
could be maintained, therefore, that the Roman people
more frequently pardoned than they acquitted, particularly since pardoning and acquittal, at least in their practical effect, had come to be identical.
This unusual situation should also explain, among other
things, why the chief weapon used by the Roman forensic
orator was the argumentum in personam, that is, gross
and libellous attacks upon the opponent or prosecutor
which often were as galling as they were untrue. In
flagrant disregard of the dignified ways of old, the use of
slandrous invective and personal abuse of the opponent
gradually became an important feature of Roman legal
practice. Apparently the assembly enjoyed listening to
these disgraceful performances - and the pleasure of the
all-powerful and extremely fickle Roman city mob was,
after all, of the utmost importance. Galling epithets were
lavishly passed back and forth to the delight of the audience which often applauded a particularly nasty but
clever insult.
These reactions of the popular courts, undoubtedly, almost forced the advocate who wished for a favorable verdict to stoop to reprehensible tactics. Certain clever and
not too scrupulous forensic orators actually made it a
deliberate practice to play on the emotions of the populace
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in order to arouse public sentiment in favor of their client.
It was of decisive importance, therefore, to work upon and
enlist the sympathies of the court. According to tradition
Servius Sulpicius Galba was the first among the Roman
advocates who studied forensic oratory as an art, and
employed all the artifices of rhetoric in order to sway the
courts. The Roman advocate would frequently advance
the boldest and most startling appeals which often were
as silly as they were contemptible. They seem to have
been very effective nevertheless.
This situation was further aggravated by extreme license in oral examination and the taking of evidence. The
forensic orator made full use of the fact that Roman Law
at that time had no fixed rules of evidence. Anyone who
felt that he had something to say about the case or the
facts underlying the case could speak up. Hearsay evidence was permitted and any number of prominent persons might be heard on their opinions. The social prominence of such "witnesses," who went by the significant
name of laudatores (praisers), in itself was considered an
adequate substitute for real knowledge of the facts on
their part. To have less than ten such laudatoreswas considered an outright disgrace.
The ordinary Roman, who made up the popular court,
seems to have loved action of the dramatic or comic sort,
and the Roman forensic orator made lavish use of the
strongest figures of rhetoric in order to achieve a dramatic
or comic effect. Tradition has it that when Manlius was
indicted before the people's court, he merely pointed in
a dramatic gesture to the Capitol which he had saved by
his alertness and bravery from capture by the enemyand he was acquitted with loud acclamation. In like
manner the Roman advocate would have an old soldier
bare his scars received in the defense of Rome, and thus
procure an acquittal though punishment would have
been proper; he would induce the defendant to commend
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his children to the court, appointing it the guardian of
his presumed orphans-and acquittal followed this pitiful appeal. He would see to it that the mother, the wife,
the sisters and the children of the defendant should desperately cling to his client, filling the air with weeping and
wailing-and acquittal would follow promptly. Sometimes, of course, the advocate overdid this sort of thing:
in the midst of an impassioned appeal, a little boy was
brought into court crying bitterly, as though he wept
over the impending loss of his father. When asked why
he cried so pitifully, the boy, who apparently had been
poorly coached in his role, sobbed: "Because I have just
been birched." Naturally, the assertion that if this "noble
man" should be found guilty Rome itself would perish,
were legion. To quote but one instance: in his defense of
Murena, Cicero concluded with the startling declaration:
"Believe me, Your Honors, in the case at bar you are deciding not merely the fate of Murena, but the fate of us
all."
XVIII
Another practice, which gradually gained favor with
the forensic orators and allegedly goes back to Largius
Licinius, was that of hiring claques; and it was said that
the worst advocates retained the greatest number of professional "applauders." These hired claques might have
been a development of the crowd of supporters, friends or
character witnesses (laudatores) whom the litigant
brought into court in earlier days in order to "strengthen"
his cause. The following story made the rounds in ancient
Rome: Domitius Afer, a competent and respected lawyer,
while arguing a case was suddenly interrupted by loud
and prolonged shouting, coming from the adjoining court.
After the noise had subsided, Afer resumed his address,
only to be interrupted again by another round of applause
next door. He stopped for a second time and, as soon as
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feasible, tried to go on. But for a third time he had to
"rest his case" on account of renewed outbursts of applause. Thoroughly annoyed by this time, Afer inquired
who was pleading in the next "court room." When told
that it was Largius Licinius, he exclaimed: "This is the
death-blow to the legal profession." But it seems that the
practice of employing claques in court continued for some
time. Their outcries of disapproval or approbation often
shook the walls of the Roman "court rooms" or reverberated through the Forum. Needless to say, this whole disgusting scene, as a rule, had been carefully rehearsed in
advance.
These melodramatic methods, as previously noted, frequently secured an acquittal-or pardon-no matter how
guilty the defendant may have been. In addition, the dress
and the general demeanor of the defendant often were
carefully adjusted to the occasion. He sat close to his
lawyer, like a helpless and frightened child huddling
against its mother; his hair and beard were uncombed
and uncut; and he was clothed in ragged garments-the
touching image of the homeless exile. And while his
lawyer pleaded vociferously, he himself implored the
compassion of the court by tearful looks and mute gestures of despair. Nor was he the only suppliant. As previously noted, the defendant brought along his weeping
wife dressed as a widow, his sorrowful parents and his
wailing children acting the part of orphans. If his parents
had died or if he had no children of his own, he could always hire someone for the occasion. More than that: a
host of friends, frequently persons of importance, accompanied him, all garbed in deep mourning. Naturally, all
these devices, meant to impress the court, had been carefully arranged in advance by the crafty advocate who had
coached the actors in their respective roles. The practice
of bringing "friends" into court on such occasions led to so
much abuse that in the year 52 B.C. a statute was passed

THE LEGAL PROFESSION

(Vol. XXX

forbidding any person to appear in behalf of the accused
unless he was a close relative. As might be expected, this
statute was more honored in its breach than in its observance.
It was in the spirit of the Roman advocate's appeal to
emotion and sentiment that Cicero put the usefulness of a
soldier above that of his own profession. In this particular
instance Cicero defended a famous general, Murena, who
had been indicted, and rightly so, for embezzlement. "Can
there be any doubt," Cicero cried, "that the military profession is superior to the legal profession?" "You," he said,
pointing to the prosecutor, the renowned lawyer, Servius
Sulpicius, "burn the midnight oil in order to write opinions for your clients; he steals hours from his sleep so that
he may arrive early with his army at the place to which he
is advancing; you are awakened by the crowing of the
rooster, he by the clang of trumpets; you draw pleadings
on paper, he draws up troops on the battle-field; you take
care of cases, he that cities and fortresses are not lost to
the enemy; he knows how the hosts of the enemy are repulsed, you know only when an action in trespass lies; he
knows how to enlarge the boundaries of his country, you
are an expert in rights in land." Murena was acquitted.
The remarkable feature of this whole performance of Cicero was that a lawyer should disparage his own profession
solely in order to win a case whose merits seem to have
been extremely doubtful.
XIX
Nor were these appeals to emotion by forensic orators
confined to the defense only. Similarly effective displays
frequently were presented by the prosecution in order to
excite horror and indignation against the defendant in
a criminal proceeding. Sometimes, if a murder had been
committed, the foul deed in all its repulsive details was
re-enacted during the trial so that the eyes of the people
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could rest on the hideous scene while their ears were
filled with cries of revenge against the accused. Mark Antony, for instance, aroused the Roman populace to the
highest pitch of fury when he lifted up Caesar's bloody
toga and pointed to the rents made by the daggers of the
assassins.
The fact that trials before the popular assembly were
held in the open, greatly helped in making all these practices more effective. An orator with a stentorian voice
could be heard by a large throng across the whole Forum.
Thus tradition had it that Trachallus, a forensic orator of
doubtful repute, could outshout every other speaker. The
following amusing, though probably apocryphal incident,
has been recorded. In one court a man was quietly tried
for murder, while in the adjoining court a stentorian advocate pleaded a suit in damages with such emphasis
that he completely drowned out the soft-spoken lawyer
for the accused murderer. As a result, a thoroughly confused jury awarded damages to the murderer.
The fact that trials were held in the open probably
saved Lucius Piso. While on trial for his life, a sudden
shower came down just at the very moment the court was
about to condemn him. The court adjourned and sought
cover. But Lucius, on the advice of his lawyer, not only
remained out in the rain but throwing himself upon
the ground rolled in the mud. This miserable. sight so
moved the court that he was acquitted.
It goes without saying that professional ethics were
unknown to, or at least, disregarded by the forensic
orators. They did not consider it improper, for instance,
to demand that a prospective client retain also the advocate's partner or protege. In any event, towards the end
of the first century A.D., Pliny seems to have insisted on
such practices which apparently had been in vogue for
some time. "You ask me," Pliny wrote to a prospective
client, "to represent you without a fee in a cause in
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which you are interested. I will do so, but not without a
fee.... But I shall also ask of you a favor and, indeed, shall
make it a stipulation, namely, that Cremutius Ruso shall
be retained along with me. For this is my usual custom,
and what I have done frequently...
XX
A few words may be in order concerning the remuneration the Roman lawyer received for his efforts. From
earliest times it had been the custom to look upon the
services of the lawyer or advocate as something that ought
to be rendered gratuitously. Any reward which a client
might bestow upon his "protector" was purely honorary,
done in discharge not of a legal obligation but of a debt
of gratitude. This idea, it seems, was encouraged and
kept up for a long time, because it was feared that the
legal profession, originally an aristocratic calling, would
otherwise degenerate into a mean and mercenary business. Obviously, the origin of the idea of gratuitous service is closely related to the circumstances under which
advocacy made its first appearance in early Rome: as previously noted, it was simply the chivalrous help and assistance which was afforded by the patron to his "clients"
-by the strong to the weak. In other words, it was the
intercession in behalf of a friend, neighbor or suppliant
and, therefore, primarily a manifestation of the spirit of
neighborliness or civic-mindedness.
In such a situation pecuniary reward was simply unthinkable: all assistance was rendered gratuituously. But
as legal business expanded with Rome's advance from a
pastoral community to a complex city-state and, finally,
to a world-empire, more time, more effort, more study and
more "know-how" became necessary to qualify as a successful lawyer. The natural and perhaps inevitable consequence of this evolution was that those who applied
themselves to the ever more. complicated tasks of the
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legal profession did so more and more in order to gain a
livelihood. The fact that the Roman legal profession gradually had ceased to be a purely aristocratic profession recruited from the wealthiest families, also had much to do
with this development. In other words, people began to
pursue the legal calling who could not afford to render
professional services without some sort of remuneration.
Undoubtedly, the taking of fees was considered an abuse
and an indignity, and, no doubt, there were scandals. Accordingly, in the year 203 (or 204 B.C.) a statute was
enacted forbidding the charging or paying of legal fees
to a lawyer. The author of this statute was Manlius Cincius Alimentus, after whom it was called lex Cincia de
donis et muneribus, or simply, lex Cincia.
It seems safe to assume that this statute was frequently
violated. The old aristocrat of the Roman Bar was primarily interested in serving the Republic and in gaining
popularity, fame and prestige, and possibly an exalted
position in the administration of the commonwealth. And
there was no more successful mode of securing all this
than gratuitous legal services. But towards the end of the
Roman Republic the former motives and incentives for
public service gradually had vanished. With the advent
of military despotism there was no longer room for an
honorable public career. For what man of high moral
caliber would care to become a consul if, as it was the
case under Emperor Caligula (37-41 A.D.), one might
have a horse as a colleague in this office? In addition, an
entirely different class of people began to follow the law.
Hence the calling of a lawyer or advocate came to be pursued solely for the sake of its financial emoluments, and
the lex Cincia, although never formally repealed, became
a dead letter. Some of the more notorious advocates
amassed huge fortunes: Cicero, who had started out as a
relatively poor man, became many times a millionaire,
while the wealth of Crassus, accumulated by generations
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of advocates, was simply phenomenal.
Quintilian (c. 35-100 A.D.), still reflecting the old Republican tradition, insisted that since the lawyer in Rome
could not claim a legal fee as a debt, it must be considered
a gift received as a voluntary offering in acknowledgment
of his good offices by a grateful client. He raised the question, nevertheless, whether a lawyer must undertake a
law suit gratuitously. He denied that the only honorable
course of action is to work without pecuniary reward,
arguing that one possessing professional competence could
accept pay for his services without prejudice to his name
or profession. Especially if the state of his economic affairs requires him to earn a livelihood, a man need not
refuse compensation for his efforts. Quintilian then went
on to state that he could not think of a fairer or more
proper way of making money than through the practice
of law, since, while doing so, he renders invaluable service
to people in need. Indeed, the charging of fees is not only
proper but necessary in view of the fact that by his exertions and the great amount of time he devotes to the affairs
of others, the lawyer is prevented from gaining a livelihood by any other means. But moderation should always
be practiced. Bargaining for a fee or taking advantage of
the distress of a client in order to extort a large sum of
money is both vile and dishonest. The honorable man
will never try to get more than is fair; and whatever he
receives, he receives, not as a debt due to him, but as a
form of acknowledgment. In sum, the services of a
lawyer should not be sold for money but neither should
they go unrewarded. So far Quintilian.
It is interesting to compare these-passages from Quintilian with the statement made by Sir John Davy on the
same subject: "The fees or rewards which . . . [the lawyers of England] receive are not of the nature of wages,
or pay, or that which we call salary or hire .... But that
which is given to a learned counsellor, is called honorar-
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ium..., being indeed a gift which giveth honour as well to
the taker as tq the giver: neither is it certain or contracted
for, for no price or rate can be set upon counsel, which is
invaluable and inestimable, so as it is more or less according to circumstances, namely the ability of the client, the
worthiness of the counsellor, the weightiness of the cause,
and the custom of the country."

The history of the Roman forensic orator also had its
nobler moments, worthy of the legal profession at its
best. When the consul Philippus, in one of his famous
mob harangues, made a fierce attack upon the Roman
Senate, Lucius Licinius Crassus, an outstanding advocate,
rose to the occasion. He spoke with great eloquence about
the integrity of the Senate which, in the words of Lucius,
throughout its long and distinguished history had never
been found wanting in its duty to the Roman people and
the Roman commonwealth. And when Philippus, dismayed by this scathing rebuke, tried to threaten him personally, Lucius retorted: "If you wish to frighten me into
silence, this tongue of mine must first be cut out. And
even if that were done, my free spirit with its very breath
would continue denouncing your wickedness." Under the
circumstances these were certainly courageous wordswords not always spoken in similar situations. For, as
Cicero admitted, "as soon as the note of civil war is
heard, our profession becomes conspicuously mute."
Cicero, himself, however, on being reproached for having championed an unpopular cause, made a statement
which should forever be cherished by lawyers: "The
principle can never be admitted that we may not defend
even our enemies against the accusations of our friends.
As for me, it is no longer an open question whether I may
refuse the aid of my services in averting danger from the
accused.... I would be acting a cowardly, mean and un-
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grateful part if I were to relinquish now these exertions.
...The consequence of such a conduct on my part would
be that [a person] might be unable to find a lawyer to
champion his cause in a republic where the wisdom of
our ancestors has provided that not even the lowliest
citizen should be without counsel." Speaking on the same
subject, Quintilian observed, however, that "the advocate
may not undertake the defense of every one; nor will he
turn the harbor of his eloquence into a port of refuge for
pirates.... Do not let any false shame prevent him from
abandoning a case which he had agreed to undertake
under the impression that it was a just cause, when he discovers in the course of the trial that it was dishonest or
unjust. But he ought to give advance notice to his client
of his intention."
There were a number of men in Rome who, having
started as forensic orators, came to realize that "it is disgraceful for a man who professes to be an advocate, to be
ignorant of the law." One of these men was Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a contemporary of Cicero. Of him it was
said afterwards that "he did not so much consider himself
a lawyer or advocate, but a servant of justice." His constant endeavor was to temper the severity of the law by
referring to the principles of equity, and "he had less
pleasure in advising that legal action ought to be taken
than in removing the cause for litigation." It was a rebuke
from the great jurisconsult Q. Mucius Scaevola to which
he owed his conversion to law. He had turned to Scaevola
for legal advice in a case he was about to argue, but
showed himself utterly unable to understand the advice
Scae.vola gave him. Exasperated, the latter berated him
for his ignorance. Stung by this reproach, Servius Sulpicius Rufus devoted himself to the study of law with
such energy and success that he soon achieved a reputation as a lawyer and jurisconsult which surpassed even
that of Scaevola. Cicero seems to have echoed the re-
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mark of Scaevola when he exclaimed: "What can be
considered more disgraceful than that a man, who professes to undertake the causes of his friends and assist
those who are in difficulties

. .., should

so blunder in the

easiest and most trifling cases as to appear to some an object of pity, to others a target of contempt."
Publius Rutilius Rufus, who enjoyed a great reputation as an advocate, also was a true student of the law.
He was much sought after by clients, and his learning,
professional integrity and high ethical standards earned
him the love and admiration of his fellow-citizens. He
condemned the common practice of appealing to the emotions of the popular courts, insisting that a case should
stand on its own merits. Cicero said about him that he
was "a model of spotless innocence," and Velleius Paterculus maintained that he was the most excellent person,
not only of his own age, but of all ages. Like Publius
Rutilius Rufus, Hortensius, the friend of Cicero, kept himself aloof from all party strifes and political intrigues,
preferring to concentrate on his practice and, incidentally, on a very luxurious style of living. When he died,
Cicero remarked that "at a time when so few wise and
good citizens were left, we had to mourn the loss of the
authority and the good sense of so distinguished a man
...who died at a period when the Republic needed him
most." Cicero's penchant for superlatives aside, there is
still considerable evidence to support his praise, although
tradition also has it that at one time he was privy to a
bribery of the court. Like so many people who perform
before a large audience, Hortensius was an extremely
vain person. He is said to have once brought an action in
trespass against a man who had accidentally bumped
into him and displaced the carefully arranged folds of his
toga.
As time went on, the forensic orator gradually became a
learned .jurist, which is only another way of saying that,
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to some extent, forensic oratory was replaced by legal
learning. Or to put this same idea differently, mere oratory ceased to be sufficient for the successful practice of
law. In this fashion the classical Roman jurist emerged,
who became the model of all subsequent ages. But this
development extended far into the Imperial period of Roman legal history and is outside the scope of this paper.
The decline of forensic oratory was accelerated by the
advent of military despotism. Eloquence cannot flourish
under despotic rule and oratory, at least the grand-style
oratory, withers under the constant threat of swift and
cruel retaliation: it cannot exist without free institutions,
except for the purpose of opposing tyranny at the peril of
life and fortune. But a few men in Rome would risk their
lives for the cause of liberty which by now seemed to be
a hopeless cause, as the fate of Cicero and that of Cremutius Cordus clearly indicate.
XXII
As has been shown, the forensic orators or advocates, on
the whole, brought with them no particularly high standards of character, professional conduct or professional
achievement of their own. They often prided themselves
on their recklessness, partisanship and ignorance of the
law. Being primarily interested in the material emoluments of their activities rather than in devoted public
service, they began, among other things, to monopolize
the handling of criminal and civil cases. Frequently they
displayed not only a deplorable lack of scruples and conscience, but also unbridled greed and avarice. This decline of the Roman legal profession, which coincided with
the rise of the forensic orator, practically necessitated the
establishment and, wherever possible, the enforcement of
a distinct "code" of professional standards and professional conduct. Effective measures had to be devised to
restrain these excesses which had been imported from
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Greece where they had flourished for some time.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the exact
source or sources from which came the demand to have
restraints imposed upon the Roman legal profession and
its activities. But it would not be amiss to surmise that
the better elements within the profession-the jurist-lawyers, who had always observed high professional standards-themselves urged and welcomed the introduction of
a policy of restraint. The following incident can be quoted
in support of this theory. When around the year 54 A.D.
some of the less creditable legal practitioners, whose activities had been sharply curtailed, bewailed their ill
fortune, a spokesman of the jurist-lawyers observed: "Did
I not tell you that this circus would not last forever?"
This incident might very well have, happened during the
latter days of the Republic. Also the fact that the first
known legal provisions dealing with the Roman legal
profession in all likelihood were praetorian edicts suggests
that it was the jurist-lawyers who probably inaugurated
and fostered disciplinary measures. For there always existed very close professional contacts between the praetor
:--the highest Roman judicial magistrate-and the leading
jurist-lawyers who, after all, were the real authors of
most of the praetorian edicts. However, these attempts at
curbing abuses, including the unworkable lex Cincia and
the indefinite statute that only persons of good moral character may be admitted to the Bar, on the whole came to
naught. It had to be left to later generations of Roman
lawyers .and jurists to deal successfully with these serious
and pressing problems. "When, in the Imperial period,
effective steps finally were taken to protect the legal profession against despoilers, Roman lawyers regained and
thereafter retained the great esteem in which the Roman
legal profession was held during most of its long and remarkable history.
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XXII
The jurisconsult, as distinguished from the forensic
orator, continued to give both cautelary and judicial responsa throughout the whole Republican period, and this
despite the fierce competition of the orators. His main
function was to instruct clients who had the good sense
to call on an expert rather than on a charlatan. He advised them how to draw up a contract or to draft a will in
order to produce the desired results; he instructed them on
their legal rights and duties, and on possible legal remedies. The drafting of wills and contracts, in particular,
seems to have taken up much of his time. Here he had
to caution the clients not to thwart their intentions by
using the wrong formulae or by going against established
practice and tradition. Hence this type of law work also
was called by the significant name of cavere (to caution).
But already during the time of Cicero (first half of the
first century B.C.) the routine of advising and cautioning
ordinary clients in small matters had been left to less well
known practitioners and sometimes even to scribes.
Towards the end of the second century B.C. Roman
Law and Roman legal procedure became extremely involved and complicated. The ultimate settling of either
the action to be taken or the defense to be offered (the
proceedings in jure) developed into a highly technical
process which demanded great skill and a vast amount of
legal knowledge as well as experience. Hence expert advice
became indispensable, the more so since often the skill and
expertness of one lawyer were pitted against those of
another lawyer. In this fashion also the cautelary activities of the Roman jurist-lawyer were considerably expanded.
In giving of responsa, moreover, vast changes took
place. These responsa, which were to become so important
for the further development of Roman Law, were not
issued in any special form. They could be oral replies to
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oral questions but, as a rule, they were reduced to writing
if the matter was to be taken to court. The jurisconsults,
however, did not only counsel private clients seeking information; they also advisecd judicial magistrates and
triers. In this manner they exercised a decisive influence
on the whole of the Roman administration of justice.
Ordinarily, the Roman magistrate was a layman elected to
his office for the period of one year. He rarely had much
knowledge of the law. Hence it became customary for him
to seek the advice of an experienced jurist-lawyer whenever he had to render an important decision.
In this way the Roman jurist-lawyer contributed much
to Roman Law-the most advanced law of its day which
already understood the basic legal problems of right and
duty, privilege and immunity, etc. He conceived law and
the legal order as an institution for delimiting and securing man's interests and powers of action - powers which
in their aggregate make up the legal personality of the
individual. This Roman concept of the legal personality
was the first tangible and workable expression of the idea
that the human person has a certain irreducible worth.
Probably the most outstanding pronouncement which the
ancient world made concerning the inherent dignity of
man, was the insight, gained by Roman jurists, that in a
politically organized society under the rule of law man
possesses certain clearly defined rights which the law or
the legal order alone can fully realize. This basic insight
reflects the ability as well as humanity of the Roman legal
profession.
XXIV
Of great importance also was the Roman jurist-lawyer's
collaboration in the framing of the all-important -praetorian edicts, the provincial edicts and the aedilicianedicts.
It can be claimed that the vast majority of these edicts
were the work of jurist-lawyers or jurisconsults. In any
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event, these edicts reflect the work of competent lawyers.
This is particularly true as regards the one fundamental
function of these edicts, namely, constantly to perfect the
law. Legal insufficiency is most keenly felt by the lawyer
who daily deals with law and who is vitally interested in
a living and workable law which never loses contact with
reality. In addition, the Roman jurist-lawyer sometimes
acted as "special judges" or triers. Such an occasion was
always considered a noteworthy event, especially if he
was one of the more renowned lawyers or jurisconsults in
Rome.
Towards the end of the Republican period the jurisconsults, probably compelled by the fierce competition of the
forensic orators, began to appear more often in court, assuming the role of advocates. Not only did they collaborate with the courts in drafting the proper procedural
formulae in proceedings in jure, but now they also represented clients in proceedings in judicio. To this extent
they had to yield to the influence of the forensic orators.
But here they faced the unrelenting opposition of the latter and, as time went on, they became less and less able
to compete with them. The rhetorical talents of the juristlawyers or jurisconsults were no match for the grandiloquent forensic orators. Being truely professional men, the
jurisconsults were neither inclined by temperament nor
prepared by training to engage in the unscrupulous practices and tactics of the orators. Accordingly, the antagonism between the jurist-lawyers or jurisconsults and the
forensic orators or advocates remained acute, the former
having but contempt for the latter, while the latter shunned and ridiculed the former, except when they urgently
needed them for legal advice.
Aside from the jurist-lawyers and forensic orators or
advocates, there gradually developed a class of professional legal draftsmen, somewhat similar to the English
conveyancers and scriveners. This particular craft was
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frequently pursued by lesser practitioners as well as by
scribes, who tried to earn a livelihood from their scanty
knowledge of certain technical aspects of the law. This
became an extremely popular occupation for those men
who possessed neither adequate knowledge of the law nor
the gift of oratory.
XXV
The Roman legal profession of the Republican period
had started out as an aristocratic calling. These early lawyers considered themselves guardians of the law; they
were "ministers of the law" in the truest sense of the term.
In their relation to clients, on the whole, they acted the
role of the benign and wise patron, who counsels those
in need of advice and assistance. Hence the outstanding
lawyer-type of this period was the jurisconsult or juristlawyer. At the same time, the generally favorable attitude
of the Roman people towards the legal profession permitted and actually encofiraged the gradual growth of a distinct legal profession which, under these circumstances,
rose to excellence of professional achievement, justifiable
pride in professional accomplishment and eminence in social position throughout Rome.
The influx of Greek notions and manners into the
Roman orbit brought about considerable and not always
wholesome changes in the legal profession. Shallow oratory and a reckless reliance upon extra-legal media to
achieve desired results became quite prominent and marred the once splendid record of the profession. The lawyer-type that characterized this particular period of partial
decline was the forensic orator or advocate. The forensic
orators competed fiercely with the jurisconsults lor the
control of the Roman legal profession. But the jurisconsults still exerted sufficient influence to prevent the legal
profession - and Roman Law - from being wholly despoiled. Towards the end of the Republican period cer-
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tain improvements among the forensic orators and a certain rapprochement between them and the jurisconsults
can be noticed. This rapprochement had much to do with
the subsequent emergence of the great Roman jurists of
the classical period.
The advent of the Imperial rule profoundly affected the
Roman legal profession. Emperor Augustus (27 B.C.-14
A.D.), insisted that the administration and development
of law should be the concern of the Imperial central bureaucracy. This meant, in effect, that the jurisconsults no
longer were the real authors of the authoritative formulae
for legal actions and legal defenses. Also, only those jurisconsults who had received a special Imperial patent were
now permitted to give authoritative responsa. Since tyrannical rule is not conducive to rhetoric of the grand style,
the forensic orators lost much of their former luster and
effectiveness. In many instances they sank to the level of
mere quibblers. As time went on, the legal profession was
subjected to much supervision, including a number of regulations which controlled the professional deportment of
the lawyer by defining his various duties.
With the expansion of the Imperial system some of the
most outstanding jurists and lawyers began. to be summoned to the newly created Imperial Council, or promoted
to the highest administrative or judicial office throughout
the Empire. In this manner they gained a decisive influence on all matters of high-level policy. A host of lesser
lawyers was constantly drawn into the Imperial bureaucracy, where they became part of the new officialdom
which, in turn, soon reflected their efficiency. But all this
is already beyond the scope of our subject.
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